I examine effects of education on the labor force participation (LFP) of married women in an intra-household collective decision framework, in which bargaining power is endogenous. In this case, individuals's pre-marriage choices including educational choices and matching on the marriage market, determine their bargaining power. The estimated model exhibits the features that are consistent with the data. First, the female's bargaining power is increasing when a woman is more educated relative to her spouse. Second, women's LFP is an inverse U-shaped function of bargaining power. As a woman's bargaining power increases, she participates more in the labor market. However, over a certain level of bargaining power, women are less likely to work outside the home. So, this paper identifies a new channel through which education can decreases LFP. Using this model, I provide an explanation for the surprising negative relationship between women's education and their participation in the labor market in Iran.